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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the District Court in giving any weight to the results
of a blood test when no evidence was presented regarding the use
of proper procedures in drawing the defendant's blood?
2.
of

a

Did the District Court err in admitting expert testimony
so

called

Drug

Recognition

Expert

without

adequate

foundation for the testimony?
3. Did the District Court improperly give substantive weight

1

to evidence contrary to the State's case which was impeached but
not contradicted?
4. Did the District Court improperly use theories of "aiding
and abetting" based on Title 76, Utah Code, rather than the more
restrictive

language

of

Title

58, Chapter

37, Utah

Code

Annotated in its ruling that defendant was part of common scheme
or enterprise?
5, Did the District Court err in finding sufficient ev.-iuvnce
of

Possession

of

a

Controlled

Substance

With

Intent

to

Distribute?
As to the rulings on admissibility of evidence, the standard
of review is one of whether or not there was a available basis
for admission.

See State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah, 19S6).

As to the choice of law issue, the standard
error.

is correction of

As to the questions of fact, the standard of review is

that of clear error.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case is governed in part by Title 42, Chapter, 6, Section
44(1) and Section 44.10 (5)(a) of Utah Code Annotated; Title 58,
Chapter 37, Section 8, Utah Code Annotated; and Title 58,
Chapter 37a, Section 8, Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE

2

This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's con*

tion

of the Defendant of the crime of Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol

or

Drugs,

a

Class

B

Misdemeanor;

Possession

of

Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Posse ision of a
Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a Second Decree
Felony, entered by the Eighth District Court on the 10th day

f

December, 1996.
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
On or about the 12th day of August, 1996, Deputy Sh

n

Ablanalp of the Uintah County Sheriff's Office stopped a vehi

e

driven by the defendant because the vehicle's taillights did

it

appear to be working.

After stopping the vehicle, Dep

y

Ablanalp allowed the defendant to attempt to fix the tailligh >.
For officer's safety, Deputy Ablanalp asked to search the per m
of the passenger in the vehicle, one Gina Ziegenhirt.

Dep

y

Ablanalp found a zippered pouch containing what he believed .o
be paraphernalia and methamphetamine inside the pants of :
Ziegenhirt.

s

Deputy Ablanalp also believed that the defeno it

was under the influence of drugs and therefore requested

le

assistance of Deputy Don DeCamp, a so called "drug recognita ."
expert.
Ablanalp's

Based

on

earlier

Deputy

DeCampfs

observations,

the

observations,
possible

Dep

,y

control ad

substances in Miss Ziegenhirt's pants, and Deputy AblanaJ 's
opinion that t' \ defendant had been directing Miss Ziegenhi ;,

3

he was placed under arrest for Driving Under the Influence of
Drugs,

Possession

of

Paraphernalia,

and

Possession

of

a

Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute. Blood was drawn
from the defendant.

Results from testing by the State Health

Lab indicated that there was methamphetamine residue in the
defendant's system.

Testing by the State Crime Lab revealed

that the suspected controlled substance found in the pouch in
Miss Ziegenhirtfs pants was methamphetamine.
Preliminary hearing was held before Judge A. Lynn Payne on the
4th of October, 1996. After taking the matter under advisement,
the charges were bound over for trial.

On November 23, 1996,

defendant filed a request for a bench trial which was grafted.
Bench trial was held before Judge John R. Anderson on December
10, 1996. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Anderson ^ound
the defendant guilty of driving under the influence of drugs
without further finding.

As to the charges of Possession of

Paraphernalia and Possession of a Controlled Substance With
Intent to Distribute, Judge Anderson stated that he found that
the defendant and Miss Ziegenhirt were involved in a common
enterprise and therefore found the defendant guilty.
defendant

waived

time

for

sentencing

and

was

The

sentenced

immediately to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State
Prison, and two terms of six

months in jail to be served

concurrently at the Utah State Prison.

4

The issue presented to

this court involve the weight and admissibility of certain
evidence received by the court, the indications that tia court
used the wrong law in evaluating the defendant's condu 4~, and
the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction in the

*se.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in certifying Deputy Don DeCamp as an
expert in Drug Recognition based on the foundation which was
presented to the court.

While, the defendant stipulated to the

admissibility of the laboratory report regarding the blood tcken
from him subsequent to the arrest, the trial court erred

a

giving undue weight to the blood test when inadequate foundation
was laid by the State for the reliability of the procedures used
in drawing blood.

The trial court in its ruling used a theory

not allowed for in Title 58, Chapter 37 but rather used law
concerning common enterprises and aiding and abetting foun I in
the common law and Title 76 of the Utah Code.

The trial court

misconstrued the impeachment of the co-defendant by the state's
cross examination as s ostantive evidence.

The evidence w s

insufficient to show the defendant had constructive possessive
of the controlled substances found inside the pants of the codefendant .
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED THE TESTIMONY OF
DEPUTY DECAMP AS AN EXPERT WITNESS.
5

At trial, Deputy DeCamp testified that he had attended a
school

offered

Training
influence

by the Utah

regarding
of

the

drugs.

Peace Officer's Standards

recognition
Deputy

of

DeCamp

persons
professed

under
no

ad
1 he

othar

qualifications for this expertise other than this school.

He

could not vouch for the qualifications of the instructors of the
school.

He could not vouch for the scientific principles

inherent

in the examination

persons.

of suspected

drug

intoxica ad

Nevertheless he professed to have the scientific

expertise to recognize persons under the influence of drugs.
The Utah Supreme Court outlined the requirements for the
qualification of scientific experts in the case cf State V.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989).

In evaluating the admission

of expert testimony the Court first examined Rule 7u2 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence which states that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence of
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
The court rejected the proposition that only the degree of
assistance to the factfinder determined admissibility of expert
testimony.

The court discussed the test outlined in Frye V,

United States, 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

In Frye, the court

added a requirement that the proponent of this kind of evidence
must show general acceptance of the principle or technique (upon
6

which the testimony is based) in the scientific community.
imposing

more

requirements

that

just

helpfulness

to

In
the

factfinder, the Rimmasch Court warned that it was guarding
against the "tendency of the finder of fact to abandon its
responsibility to decide the critical issues and simply adopt
the judgment of the expert despite an inability to accurately
appraise the validity of the underlying science."
The Rimmasch court adopted a modification to the Frve test
which was stated in
1980).

Phi 13 ips v. Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah

In addition to a showing of general acceptance in the

scientific, expert testimony must also past as test as to
whether

the

reliable."

sciw^tific basis

for

the

test

is

"inherently

It is the burden of the proponent of the scientific

testing to lay a foundation establishing the reliability of it
for it to be admissible.
Deputy

DeCamp

did

not

No such foundation was laid here.
] rofess

to

understand

scientific principles upon which he purported

any

of

to base

the
lis

opinion. He merely present d a certification without founda ion
as to its meaning.
POINT TWO:
FOR ANY WiIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO A BLOOD TEST, THE TEST MUS4
BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED BY
THE LAW.
In this cafje, a critical piece of evidence was the result! jf
7

a blood test given to the appellant subsequent to his arrest

r

driving under the influence of drugs. There was testimony f m
Deputy Ablanalp that the appellant was taken to Ashley Val
Medical Center where someone took blood.

y

The appellant thrc : h

counsel had stipulated that the written test results from f a
Utah Health would be admissible in lieu of having the i^'o
technician come and testify personally.
admitted based on that stipulation.

No evidence was present!

as to who took blood or how it was taken.
Utah

Code

Annotated,

it

states

The tests were du /

that

In 41-6-44.10(5)1 )
"Only

a

physician,

registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized unc^:
Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, IT /
withdraw

blood

to

determine

the

alcoholic

drug

content."

Appellant placed before the court during argument this lack i i
the foundation and argued that no weight should be given to tlie
test.

The

judge

merely

stated

that

the

stipulation

to

admissibility must have been intended to include a stipulation
to complete reliability of the process of blood collection, the
chain of custody, and the results.
Presumably there are good reasons for the requirement that
only certain medical personnel may draw blood from criminal
defendants.

It is well within the common knowledge of courts

that improper handling of samples may pollute them.

It is well

within the knowledge of courts that clean sterile equipment must

8

be used or samples will reflect the nature of whatever cat* ad
the lack of sterility. While evidence may be admissible upc

a

showing of relevance and some tendency to disprove or prov< a
material fact, for evidence to be given any weight it still m. st
meet fundamental criteria of reliability.

The blood resu ts

here taken with no evidence of the proper procedures be ag
followed are inadequate to that test and should have been gi en
no value.
POINT THREE
IN EVALUATING THE TESTIMONY OF THE CO-DEFENDANT,
THE TRIAL COURT GAVE SUBSTANTIVE WEIGHT TO FACTS PRESENTED AND
IMPEACHED, BUT INFERRED AND RULED CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.
At trial/ the State called as its witness the co-defendant#
Gina Ziegenhirt. Miss Ziegenhirt testified that she reached

m

agreement with the defendant's father, a Vernal resident wher >y
she

financed

and

participated

methamphetamine in Vernal.
that

agreement.

in

a

scheme

to

distribi ce

The defendant was not present : >r

She testified

that the defendant had

10

involvement and no knowledge of any of the details of ) ar
agreement with the defendant's father.

The defendant's fat ir

asked the defendant to drive him from the Salt Lake City area co
Vernal.

Miss Ziegenhirt accompanied the defendant and i is

father to Vernal where she got a motel room.
when the defendant took his father home.

She rode ale ig
Deputy Ablan* p

stopped the vehicle on the way back to the motel. She testif *d
9

that he hardly knew the defendant and had her first real
conversation with him during the ride to Vernal from Salt I :e
City.
drugs.

So far as she knew, the defendant did not know she

td

The defendant was not part of any arrangement to

distribute or possess controlled substances.
The State treated Miss Ziegenhirt as an adverse witness < d
attempted to impeach her testimony.

So far as the court u s

concerned she apparently was not believable. There was no otf^r
evidence other than her testimony, with the possible exception
of

eye

contact between

the defendant

and Miss

Ziegenhirt

resulting in a nod by the defendant, indicating any relationship
between them.

There was no evidence presented as to any common

enterprise except the enterprise between Miss Ziegenhirt and the
defendantfs father.

The trial court was vague in its ruling.

It obviously had to treat as substantive evidence facts contrary
and opposite to the testimony of Miss Ziegenhirt to reach its
conclusion of common enterprise. Rather than just conclude that
she was not being truthful, it went on to believe that the
opposite of her testimony was true.
It is a fundamental principle of law that a party may impeach
a witness by many methods.
motives to lie.

It may show that witness had poor opportunity

to observe an event.
memory.

It may show that a witness has

It may show that a witness has a poor

It may even use contradictory statements to show that

10

a person is lying.

The use however, of impeachment, is to

discredit a witness, not to generate substantive evidence. 1 lis
principle is embodied in many decisions, for example in Delrnie
V. State, ,362 S.2d 689 (Flu App. 1978) the Florida court n led
that even prior statements made by a witness could not be used
for substantive evidence when
witness.

introduced

to discredit

1 lat

A similar result was reached in People v. McKee, i35

N.E. 2d 625 (111. 1968) where it was held that the purpose of
impeachment is to destroy the credibility of a witness, not to
prove facts used in the impeaching statement.

In effect,

-.he

court could have chosen to totally disbelieve the testimony of
Miss Zigenhirt in this case.

It could not however use ler

statement for any substantive value to the contrary of what \ as
in it.

If the court chose to disbelieve her testimony, :he

effect be as if she had not testified at all.

The case had to

stand or fall on the remainder of the evidence.

Because th re

was no evidence of any common enterprise, the court's finding of
common enterprise leads to the

inescapable conclusion that tae

court did treat Miss Zieger. lirt's denials of the defendant's
culpability as evidence that he was guilty, in error.
POINT FOUR
IN CONCLUDING THAT SOME FORM OF COMMON ENTERPRISE
EXISTED, THE TRIAL COURT WENT BEYOND THE STATUTORY BASIS FDR
THE CRIME AND USED GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW.

11

in this case, the defendant was charged and convicted of i wo
offenses defined under Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(1), nd
Chapter 37a, Section 8, two chapters known commonly known as che
Controlled Substances Act.
charged

and

convicted

of

Specifically the defendant
the

crimes

of

Possession

/as

of

a

Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute and Possession of
Paraphernalia.
defendant

was

While it is undoubtedly true that the coin

possession

of

methamphetamine

and

drug

paraphernalia, the defendant was not in possession of either.
For a finding of guilt to properly enter it must be based ex a
theory of constructive possession.

Constructive possession

defined in State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981).

as

A per on

is in constructive possession of a controlled substance wh re
the controlled substance is subject to that person's dominion or
control.

In further refining this definition, the Utah Supreme

Court in State v. Fox 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) approved ttie
language of United State v. Cardenas, 748 F.2d 1015 (5th CLr.
1984) stating that "to find that a defendant had construct!/e
possession of a drug or other contraband, it is necessary :o
prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused end
the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both tue
power and intent to exercise dominion or control over the dru ; "
In this case, the trial court made no finding of any s,,;h
nexus.

The court made no finding that the defendant had either

12

the

ability

or

the

intent

to

exercise

control

over

controlled substance found in someone else's pants.
its

decision

on

a

theory

of

common

t *

It base I

enterprise,

Commc i

enterprise is not explicitly defined within the Utah Code.

:

finds its roots in the principles of criminal responsibility f, r
the conduct of another found in Title 76, Chapter 2, Sectic i
202, Utah Code Annotated.
aiding and abetting in

That section defines the concept t ;

he commission of a crime.

The use c :

aiding and abetting concepts is prohibited in crimes defined I /
Title 57.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled in State v. Scott. 7 I

P. 2d 121 (Utah 1987)

f

hat where conduct may be evaluated und* :

the general principles of the criminal code and under tl -5
Controlled Substances Act, the more specific act applied to t) *
exclusion of the other.

A defendant charged with Distribution

of a Controlled Substance could not be convicted under the
theory of aiding and abetting other in distribution. Even where
the evidence may have been sufficient
possibly

for a factfinder to

find defendant Scott guilty, where there was the

possibility that the factfinder used an aiding and abetting
theory for its verdict, reversal was mandated. This concept was
validated in State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 where defendant c uld
not be convicted of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute under theories of aiding and abetting. The
trial court improperly used such a theory in this case.

13

POINT FIVE
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEVQNOfi>REASONABLE
DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE.
Th£re was

absolutely

no

evidence

in this case that the

defendant was in actual possession of any controlled substance
nor any paraphernalia.

If this conviction is to stand, it must

stand on the basis of constructive possession.

The basic

definition of constructive possession has already been citeJ.
See State v. Carlson, supra, U.S. v. Cardenas/ supra, and St^.a
v. EQX, supra. What evidence was there then that the defendant
had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control?
What evidence was there of a nexus between the defendant and the
controlled substance?

The defendant was the driver of the car

in which the passenger in whose pants the controlled substance
was found.

Deputy Ablanalp testified that the defendant made

eye contact with the passenger while she was being aske-.l
concerning searching her person and that he nodded his head from
side to side. Although the urine test is tainted by the state's
failure to follow its own procedure, there was a test shov^inq
controlled

substances and/or metabolite

in the defendant s

blood.
While each case is to be reviewed on its own facts, State \
Andgrton,

668

P.2d,

1258

(Utah

1983),

comparisons

an I

examinations of other cases on the constructive possession is ue

14

are useful.

The shaking of the defendant's head is subject to

many interpretations, but the most that can be inferred from it
is that the defendant knew that his passenger had some quant ty
of controlled substance. The Fox court stated that "persons • o
might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and who mi* t
even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain i „d
use the drugs can not be convicted of possession of a control] d
substance.

Knowledge and even the ability to possess do r> t

equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to mi. .a
use of that knowledge and ability." The Fox case dealt with 1 o
brothers who may have resided together in a home where marijuc ia
plants were being grown. The evidence as to one of the brotht s
was that he was at the home on an occasional basis, and t) t
mail was found around the home with his name on it.

The coi t

concluded that it could not even find a case of non-exclus

e

possession.
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, (Utah App. 1991} this coi t
reviewed a case similar to this one on its facts. Salas was \ a
driver of a car.
crack

behind

Controlled substances were found wedged ir a

Salas.

Salas

stated

that

his passenger

r

passengers had put the controlled substances where they we a
found.

This court listed several factor which a court cou d

review and base a finding of adequate nexus for construct! e
possession.

Salas had knowledge that the controlled substanc s

15

were placed in his car. The defendant had only a tenuous basis
at best for a finding of knowledge of the controlled substc ees.
Salas was in a position of having non-exclusive possession
the items in his vehicle.

2r

The defendant was not even in non-

exclusive possession of the controlled substance. His pass
was in exclusive possession thereof.

ger

In dicta/ the Salas court

state that several evidentiary factors could be considered as
linking a defendant with drugs.
statements.

There were none.

incriminating behavior.

This include incriminating
These include su^piciius or

There was none.

As in Salas, the

defendant freely allowed the search of his vehicle. The factors
include the sale of drugs. There was none. The factors include
the proximity of the defendant to drugs.

Salas was closer to

and in better position to control drug than was the defendant.
The factors include drugs in plain view and drugs on defendant's
person.

There was none. Citing Anderton, the court noted that

in finding constructive possession in nonexclusive occupancy
settings, courts had relied on extensive and detailed facti 1
evidence.

There was no such detail here.

It has already been argued thai: the results of the blood tt t
should not be given any substantial weight in this case.

f

this court accepts the results at face value, ihey could provide
one of the factors cited in Salas, that is, use of drugs. There
was

evidence that

the defendant used

16

drugs on some prior

ccasion.

No testimony was presented upon which a finding of

when the defendant may have used drugs.

The value of that

factor is thus reduced.
The trial court made no detailed factual findings regarding
the nexus between defendant's conduct and the finding of the
controlled substance.
common

enterprise

Its simple statement that there was a

was

contrary

to

the

evidence.

It

is

indicative that the court did not find constructive possession.
CONCLUSION
The record in this case shows that the court made erroneous
decision in both the admissibility and the weight to be given
evidence.

The court did not find the defendant guilty of

possession of a controlled

substance nor or possession of

paraphernalia as defined by code and case law.

The court used

a theory of law which does not apply to this. The conviction in
this case should therefore be overturned.
Dated this

rf^

day of

Aftil.l

, 1997.

Alan M. Williams
Attorney for Appellant
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NO ADDENDA IS NECESSARY IN THIS CASE
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